Description of the World - Part 37
Steven Runciman, The Sicilian Vespers (The
massacre of the supporters of Charles of Anjou, the French King of Sicily, wasn’t
really the beginning of the mafia, though that was the tale I heard as a kid.
The Angevin adventure in the Mediterranean whose collapse began with the events
of March 30, 1282 was the first of the long series of French interventions in
Italy. Runciman ends the book with an anecdote about another Frenchmen who
dreamed about an Italian empire; “…King Henry IV of France boasted to the
Spanish ambassador the harm that he could do to the Spanish lands in Italy were
the King of Spain to try his patience too far. “I will breakfast in Milan,’ he
said, ‘and I will dine in Rome.’ “Then,’ replied the ambassador, ‘Your Majesty
will doubtless be in Sicily in time for Vespers.’’)
H.S.Bennett, English Books and Readers, 3 volumes
(This series covers the period from 1475 when Caxton began English printing
(albeit in Bruges) until the English Civil War, which was a Saturnalia of
printing. The bulk of printing was religious—bibles, psalters, catachisms,
sermons, tracts—a very important fact since it’s easy to focus on genres that
were, commercially speaking, marginal. More people became religious, at least
religious in an orthodox way, because of the printing press than ever became
unreligious, ruined by a book. Printing increased the bandwidth of cultural
memory and made science possible in its modern sense; but whether it increased
or decreased enlightenment on the whole, or to put it in a quasi-Hegelian way,
whether it increased the ratio of objective reason to objective delirium, is
unclear. In England, the Act of 1543 forbade the reading of the Bible in
English to “women, artificers, apprentices, journeymen, serving-men of the rank
of yeomen and under, husbandmen and labourers;” but the demands of the subject
matter and the effective and thorough control of discourse maintained by
credentialism and peer review means that a much larger proportion of the
population are fenced away from actual science that any 16th Century parliament
denied access to scripture. That there has been an increase in what most people
know since Gutenberg is surely true, but a lot of what we think of as progress
is better understood as separating out.)
Arnaldo Momigliano, Essays on Ancient and Modern
Judaism (I count myself fortunate that circumstances have allowed me to
reads books like this instead of suffering through the tediousness of novels.
The benefit of reading such books is not that the conclusions they contain are
correct—being right is a always a matter of luck, after all—but the example of
a higher standard of thoughtfulness that they represent.)
Lucien Febvre, The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth
Century: the Religion of Rabelais (I actually first read this famous book
in French or rather, since the experience was much like reading in a dream, I
went through a process that resembled reading. Reading the translation and
discovering that I had mostly guessed right was a relief. Febvre writes: “Let
us conjure up Francois Rabelais’ contemporaries—their violence and
capriciousness, their inability to resist surface impressions, their
extraordinary changes of mood, their astonishing quickness to anger, to take
offense, to draw the sword and then kiss and make up.” I wrote in the margin “The
15the Century on a bun,” characteristically getting the century wrong. Whether
or not these personality traits capture something of the central tendency of
the age, they certainly appeal to Febvre, who wrote an astonishingly
enthusiastic biography of Martin Luther, which, if I recall it correctly, celebrated
his joie de vivre at greater length than his theology. Nietzsche prided
himself on having written philological essays that were plotted like romances.
The Problem of Unbelief isn’t quite a romance, but it has an equally artful
structure. Febvre builds to a very sweeping conclusion about a century that
wanted to believe, but begins with a demonstration of scholarly virtuosity—or
pedantry—about a very fine point. Some of Plato’s dialogs are like that.
Socrates spars with some sophist or other and demonstrates his ability to play
their game before he gets down to philosophy and winds up with myth. The end of
Febvre’s book is not quite a vision of the form of the good, just the summary
judgment that Rabelais could not in fact have been an atheist because the
mentality of his age didn’t have a place for such a thought. By the way, what
Febvre is claiming is not that the men of the 16th Century were starting from
premises that ruled out atheism. He’s not talking about premises. In fact, he
was critical of Calvin’s attempt to draw impious conclusions about Servetus “by
expressly accusing him of having only one aim, “to destroy religion from top to
bottom, totam religionem evertere because this result followed from his
denial of the Trinity. I wrote at the end of the chapter: “Well, lotsa folks
reason like Calvin to this day. Witness the Marxists. And intellectual
historians and even philosophy grad students (experto crede!) tend to argue
that if X said A, he must have meant B, too. One tends to think that human
reasoning has a firm skeleton, albeit one obscured by the flesh of feelings. It’s
a form of optimism.” Febvre claims that we not only assume that people before
us argued from different axioms but that they argued as we argue. That’s an
even more sweeping result than his official thesis about atheism in the 16th
Century. “The critical examination of the poetic evidence…taught us that “man
is not Man, but that men change—much more than we imagine, and at a much faster
rate.” Obviously Febvre’s book didn’t settle the broader issue once and for
all, and even his narrower conclusions about Rabelais have been endlessly
contested; but you can’t claim he didn’t present his side of the case
brilliantly. I guess I admire him in much the same way he admired Martin Luther.)
A.D.
White, A History of the Warfare of Science and Technology in Christendom,
two volumes (White is a representative of a prominent variety of 19th
Century American right thinking. HIs version of what is now sometimes called
scientism is not atheistical—liberal Protestants of his era were decidedly
pro-science—and also demonstrated what Lewis Carroll made fun of as Anglo-Saxon
attitudes. Imagine writing this sentence now: “That sturdy Teutonic and
Anglo-Saxon honesty, which is the best legacy of the Middle Ages to
christendom, asserted itself in the strongholds of theological thought, the
universities.” A serious reading
of White would have to place him in his time, something that White never tried
to do in assembling a dossier against the obscurantists. Even when I was a
senior in high school and knew very little history, I recognized that there was
something profoundly wrong about White’s methodology. He had simply pilled up
every embarrassing quotation he could find as if all the villains on the wrong
side of the Manichean struggle had the same outlook. I wondered why it was so
hard to figure out when this or that was said. The book has an allergy to
dates. I also noticed that his own sturdy Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon honesty didn’t
prevent him from writing things he must have known were false. Heroes are not
always heroes, and a man like White who had access to excellent libraries and
the linguistic skill to read original documents couldn’t claim that he didn’t
know that, for example, Galileo wasn’t above traducing his rivals, stealing
other peoples ideas and inventions, and coming up with some pretty farfetched
theories of his own (comets, tides, etc.). I find it very unlikely that White
didn’’t know how misleading, actually obviously false, this sentence was: “Ten
years after the martyrdom of Bruno the truth of Copernicus’s doctrine was
established by the telescope of Galileo.”
The astronomers, and not only the astronomers who were also Jesuits or
theologians, argued about Copernicus for many years after Galileo. You can’t
actually see the truth of the Copernican system through a telescope. What you
can see are the phases of Venus; but that observation, though it did make
Ptolemy obsolete was also perfectly consistent with Tycho Brahe’s system and several
others. Of course, simply by living in a later age, you possess the teacher’s
edition of the book, the one with the right or at least most recent answers in
the back. That makes it all too easy to assume that earlier investigators
should have guessed correctly. Darwin said that the Origin of Species was one
long argument. Well, the Warfare of Science and Theology is one long
brief. Which is why you get more credit for being Darwin than you do for being
Jonny Cochran.)
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