The Crisis of the Twenty
First Century
If you search the pages of
John Froissart’s Chronicles of England,
France, and Spain for any notice of the Black Death, you’ll be
disappointed. Even though this contemporaneous account of the 14th
Century includes many pages telling the story of Edward III’s famous victory at
the Battle of Crecy in 1346, you won’t find even a sentence about the plague
that arrived in Europe less than two years later. The battle resulted in
several thousand deaths. The plague claimed millions and reduced the population
of Europe by almost a half. There’s nothing particularly surprising in
Froissart’s indifference to a happening of much larger moment than the
squabbles of kings. In concentrating on the collision of dynasties and the pageant
of wars, Froissart was, to use his own words, interested in “la noble matière
du temps passé” just as Herodotus had written his history so that “the great
and wonderful deeds of the Greeks and the Barbarians would not be forgotten.”
For Froissart, as for so many others, history is about the alpha dogs, a
properly mammalian affair. The doings of bacteria don’t count. A fortiori, less showy natural events
are at most background for what men do even if they have more to do with the
outcome of wars and revolutions than the vanity of princes or the syllogisms of
ideologues.
There have certainly been
historians who paid attention to natural occurrences like epidemics—Thucydides’
describes in some detail the plague that struck Athens in the early years of
the Peloponnesian war and obviously takes it seriously as a causal factor in
the decline of his city—but historians have trouble integrating natural
occurrences into their narratives, especially when, unlike outbreaks of the
plague, non-human inputs into the story occur gradually. The insidiousness of
climate change makes it especially difficult for historians to deal with. Even
those who take a sociological approach to history—Charles Tilly, Jack
Goldstone, Ernst Gellner, Michael Mann*—don’t have much to say about major
climate events such as the Little Ice Age though the timing of fits of extended
bad weather matches quite well with eras of social upheaval and demographic
stasis or collapse. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie wrote a book on the methodological
and scientific problems inherent in integrating the natural history of the
climate with human history (Times of
Feast, Times of Famine). That was back in ’67, though, and its rather
surprising that so few serious historians have returned to the theme. Mike
Davis related shorter-term climate fluctuations like El Niño to some of the
great droughts and famines of the 19th Century in his Late Victorian Holocausts, but Davis
focuses in that book on the role of imperialism and free market capitalism in
turning these natural events into human catastrophes.
All of this makes Geoffrey
Parker’s treatment of climate change as an independent variable in early modern
history extremely welcome. Global Crisis
is a detailed and wide-ranging examination of the disasters that beset almost
all the nations of the Northern Hemisphere between 1618 and 1700 and the
famines, floods, and droughts that may account for their otherwise mysterious
simultaneity. The English Civil War, the Thirty Years War in Germany, the
Fronde in France, civil wars in Turkey, the collapse of Spanish power, the
Russian Time of Troubles, the rapid decline of the Polish monarchy, the fall of
the Ming dynasty, and the wars that led to the establishment of the Tokugawa
shogunate all took place within the same few decades. Why? Others have
recognized that there was a general crisis, and people like Goldstone have
looked for common causes for a worldwide epidemic of political instability.
Parker makes the case that the great overarching fact of this unhappy century
was the cooling of the climate by a couple of degrees Celsius. What makes this
these thesis particularly significant is that the magnitude of the climate
change we’re undergoing right now will almost surely be larger than 2°. Even
ignoring the more dramatic effects, even mildly increased temperatures raise
death rates and lower agricultural productivity.
Parker is a serious
historian, well known for his work on the Dutch revolt, the vicissitudes of the
Spanish empire, and the military revolution of the 17th Century.
After traversing the 800 pages of Global
Crisis, few readers will accuses him of oversimplifying anything. His point
is not that everything that happened in the 17th Century is
explicable in terms of the weather, but that colder weather interacted in
specific ways with existing institutions and other forces to produce a spectrum
of results, resulting, for example, in stronger central governments in some
countries (France, England, Japan) and weakened or failed states in others
(Spain, Poland, the Ottoman empire.)
Climatologists talk of
anthropogenic CO2 as a forcing, i.e., an independent variable that
impacts the climate as a whole. Parker treats climate change in an analogous
way as if the effects of colder weather ramified through demographic, agricultural,
economic, political, and eventually ideological subsystems of history in much
the same way that pushing down the break pedal increases the hydraulic pressure
even in distant lines. What’s fascinating about his book is the investigation
of how the shorter growing seasons, larger floods, and longer droughts of the
Little Ice Age promoted mass starvation, widespread plagues, and endless wars,
a Malthusian crisis that lowered the population of many countries by one third
in Germany, Poland, Russia, China, and the Ottoman empire. People were actually
stunted by the stress as attested by the average height of recruits in the
French army, which fell to a little more than 5 feet. The philosopher Hobbes, a child of this era, famously spoke
of the life of man as naturally solitary, poor, brutish, and short; but perhaps he was just generalizing from
what he could see around him in the stricken Europe of his times.
Disaster movies predispose
us to think of general catastrophe in terms of big, showy disasters; but slow
works, too, and it compounds the problems it creates by making it harder for
those subject to the crisis to understand and deal with what’s going on. The
people of the 17th Century knew that things were much worse than
usual; but they trotted out the traditional explanations, which generally
involved human turpitude and divine anger. It never seemed to occur to them
that it was illogical to blame something that does not change for something
that does change. Our behavior is always deplorable, after all. Why did Jehovah
pick 1618 to do something about it? To be fair, the historians often fall into
the same fallacy, explaining specific regional events like the English Civil
War, the fall of the Ming dynasty, or the Thirty Years War by pointing to
factors like governmental incompetence as if the governments hadn’t been
incompetent before. It’s not that the stupidity of princes or even the general
shortcomings of human nature are irrelevant, however. What’s needed—and this is
the great virtue of Parker’s book—is an explanation of why and how
institutional weaknesses become fatal under novel pressure.
In most places, the ruling
powers attempted to deal with the crisis of the 17th Century, which
they experienced not as climate change but as endless riots and revolts, by
asserting stronger control. The last half of the century was the time in which
princes attempted, with variable success, to unify the patchwork of territories
that constituted pre-modern kingdoms and also to assert their power at a finer
grain. The attempt failed in Poland, Spain, and most of Germany; but it
succeeded in France, England, China, and Japan, thus ushering in the Age of
Absolutism. Incidentally, a significant feature of the revolution in governance
was a great increase in data collection by central governments—Colbert, who is
portrayed as the selfless, civil servant
in Man in the Iron Mask movies, was actually the relentless, rather
sinister master of the Ancien Regime’s version of the NSA. He ransacked the
archives of the local French parliaments in order to assemble the immense
repository of information needed to assert central control over a fractious
society under perpetual pressure, much of it from climate.
It wasn’t just kings who had
to adjust. The famines, floods, and droughts of this period caused riots and
insurrections that made it difficult for local elites to maintain local
dominance with their own resources. The magnates of the older feudal system
resented central authority, but they couldn’t continue to extract surpluses
from the population in the old feudal way. Where the state didn’t simply break
down, a new solution emerged, not one in which privilege was in any sense
diminished, but one in which the aristocrats gave over political power to the
state in exchange for service in the military and civil service. In lieu of
lords of the castle, the great ones became courtiers at Versailles or Edo. This
transition did not occur easily or peacefully, but under the right
circumstances it could work, in part because declines in population made it
easier for the powers that be to deal with fresh climatic disasters. There were
simply fewer people left to feed, and the improved efficiency of government led to
better responses to emergencies.
It may not be reasonable to
draw a parallel between the emergence of Absolutism in the 17th
Century and the growth of technocratic totalitarianism in our times, at least
in point of what’s causing nations all around the world to screw the lid on as
tightly as they can, imprison large portions of their citizenry, and put cameras
on the street lamps. As I have suggested before, the increase in inequality and
the loss of political freedom that goes with seems to be largely a consequence
of the absence of any credible threat to power-holding groups in the wake of
the collapse of the Left. Where people at large can be more effectively
exploited, they will be, simply because they can be. Domination of the many by
the few is the default case, at least since the Neolithic; and it is times and places
where liberty is more general that call for special explanation.
Unfortunately, the worst
consequences of the current round of climate change lie ahead of us; and the
concerted action required to deal with the consequences of climate change really
will justify additional centralization and executive rule, especially if, as
appears likely, the squabbling oligarchs and culture warriors will prevent
responsible representative government from functioning effectively. There
simply won’t be any alternative. It very much matters, however, who will be in
charge and what they believe in. People are forever saying that the devil is in
the details, but I’m inclined to embrace the slightly different cliché: God is
in the particulars. The 17th Century shows that a range of responses
are possible even under dire conditions. Thus while France opted for personal
rule and the suspension of representation under Louis XIV and Japan opted for
stasis and isolation under a rigid oligarchy, England kicked out its would-be
Sun King, James II, in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and devised a workable
constitutional monarchy that combined a stronger and more rational bureaucracy
with a functioning parliament. Unfortunately, the political history of the era
also provides plenty of precedents for mere collapse as a response to
challenge. The key variable seems to have been whether the aristocrats could be
conquered or bought off or if they preferred the destruction of their nations
to losing some of their power as was the case, for example, in Poland where one
of the great powers of Europe was paralyzed by the nobility’s reckless use of
the veto to prevent effective responses to internal and external challenges.
As I freely admit,
historical analogies are bunk. Our situation differs from the Global Crisis of
the 17th Century in an enormous number of ways. Our technology is
vastly beyond anything available or even imaginable in the past, for example.
On the other hand, since a Malthusian crash has yet to occur, the governments of
the 21st Century will have to deal with climate change at a time
when populations are at an all time maximum and we’ve already availed ourselves
of some of the technical options to avoid calamity this long—there is no
guarantee that a second green revolution is practically possible. Even if you
consult history merely as a stimulus to thought, however, it seems to me that
what happened before in the earlier climate crisis does point to some of the
dimensions of the problems we’re going to face.
Oddly, the climate
denialists have more clarity about what’s going on than many others. When they
aren’t just shilling for oil and coal companies, their opposition to the
possibility of global warming is rooted in a fear of the increasing reach of
central governments or international agencies. It isn’t so much that they think
that global warming is unlikely as that they find the political consequences of
dealing with it intolerable. The science is simply not the issue. Indeed, you
sometimes encounter denialists who accept the possibility that something may
have to be done after all, at which point they begin to dream about drastic,
science fiction-style technical solutions. Filling the upper atmosphere with
rocket-borne sulfur dioxide to block the sun or dumping tons of iron into the
ocean to increase uptake of CO2 by bacteria strikes them as
preferable to the horrors of more stringent fuel efficiency standards,
subsidized photovoltaic power, or reminding people to turn off the lights.
Climate denialism is no more
about atmospheric physics than creationism is about biology. What it is about
is not mysterious. Especially in the U.S., denialism is largely about
protecting the freedom of elites to control people locally and extract rents from them without
paying too much of a cut to a central authority. The rules and regulations of
central governments often protect and enlarge the rights of individuals; but
they inevitably interfere with the prerogatives of bosses, clerics, and
fathers. The liberties they swear to protect are their own, and in their usage
“liberty” retains its ancient legal meaning, which was privilege as when you
read in old books about the liberties of particular English cities or colleges
at Oxford or Cambridge. In those days a liberty was a license to legally do things that other
institutions or individuals could not. Dealing with climate change really does impinge on such
liberties. Crucially, it limits the right of CO2-producing
industries to avoid paying damages for the harm they do to every one. Meanwhile, it also
irritates larger groups like car owners, who also think of their privileges as
human rights; and this automotive Herrenvolk is far more numerous than the tiny
group of oil and coal execs who are the only ones who substantially benefit from delaying action on climate.
Unfortunately, while climate
skepticism is about politics and therefore operates largely in the realm of the
unreal, climate change is mere fact and will take place regardless of anybody’s
ideological posturing. As it takes place, governments will have to deal with it
and its consequences, though like the regimes of the 17th Century
they may not recognize or admit the underlying cause of increasing social and
economic disorder. This may be
possible for a long time. Just as one cannot prove that any given heat
wave, drought, or hurricane is a result of global warming, it will continue to
be possible to deny that revolutions, civil wars, and economic stagnation are
indirect effects of the same forcing. This second-order denialism may already
be in play. How many accounts of the Syrian debacle point out that the drying
out of the countryside is one of the reasons that Homs and Damascus are full of
displaced, miserable peasants?
As previously averred, I’m
dubious about drawing any conclusions from historical parallels, though like
Levi-Strauss, another skeptic about history, I also recognize that even if
history takes the place of myth in our thinking, it is not really possible to
dispense with it, if only as an inevitable rhetoric. Speaking of Levi-Strauss: back in
1962, in the last chapter of the Savage
Mind, the anthropologist wrote a famous put-down of Jean Paul Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reasoning for
its privileging of history, especially a piece of history sacred to leftists of
his era. “... the problem raised by the critique
de la raison dialectique is reducible to the question: under what
conditions is the myth of the French Revolution possible?” Levi-Strauss goes on
to argue that the history that matters continually changes. “We are still ‘in
focus’ so far as the French Revolution is concerned, but so we should have been
in relation to the Fronde** had we lived earlier.” He goes on to claim and even
demonstrate using the example of the Fronde that “thought is powerless to
extract a scheme of interpretation from events long past.” An old pedant like me can’t resist
noting the irony that books like Parker’s Global
Crisis are showing that the Fronde may be coming back in focus after
all.
* Michael Mann the
sociologist, not Michael Mann the climatologist.
** The Fronde was a series
of revolts from 1648 to 1653 against the regency government of Cardinal
Mazarin, who was ruling France in the name of the juvenile Louis XIV. The
regional parliaments and many nobles objected to the taxes the regency imposed
without the permission of the Estates General and had other grievances. Few of
us remember this affair now—in many history books it’s represented as a rather
ridiculous insurrection conducted by incompetent rebels. Louis XIV never forgot
it.