Memories are Made of This
Recent
 polls indicate that George Bush’s standing with the public is becoming 
more favorable. That’s depressing, but not very surprising. Unless 
there’s something wrong with your own memory, you ought to have learned 
by now that the public’s memory is extremely short. In fact, for most 
people, most of the time, memory is a social phenomenon even though it 
manifests itself through individual nervous systems. Small wonder, then,
 that a great many people can’t recall the several disasters of Bush’s 
reign since the communal recollection engine isn’t doing its work and, 
of course, our justice system has decisively flunked its vital mnemonic role. 
That
 memory is predominately a sociological fact has got to be the most 
unpopular idea I’ve ever tried to float in a lifetime of floating 
unpopular ideas, at a minimum right up there with the  claim that 
thought is not something contained in brains, that the self is in the 
world and not in the skull. I admit that reading Maurice Halbwachs’ La 
memoire collective is more a chore than a pleasure. He not only writes 
as a sociologist. He writes like a sociologist. What really makes his 
ideas hateful, however, isn’t just a matter of prose style. We really 
don’t want to admit that the human world is not built out of individual 
minds the way that a wall is made out of bricks. Perhaps that’s why, 
though the social nature of memory is a basic part of Nietzsche’s 
outlook and Nietzsche could certainly write, nobody gets that part. As 
Nietzsche himself wrote someplace, in such cases there is an auditory 
hallucination. It seems like something was said and heard, but no 
transaction took place.  
Well,
 as the case of Bush’s rehabilitation shows, Halbwachs and Nietzsche 
were optimists. Nietzsche took it that memory stopped with the 
grandparents. The Heidelberg Egyptologist Jan Assmann, following 
Halbwachs, estimates that social memory stretches back 70 years or so. 
Before that is the imminently ignorable history written in books and 
entombed in museums, the dead zone between lived experience and the 
sacred origin stories. You’d think that longer lifespans would lengthen 
social memory—lots of people know their great grandparents these 
days—but the reverse appears to be the case. I once read about an 
anthropologist who visited an isolated tribe of aborigines twice. On his
 second visit, which only took place a few years after the first, he 
asked whether anybody remembered him. “Yes, there’s an old story about 
that…” When I talk to San Francisco State students about Vietnam, it 
might as well have occurred in the dreamtime. They’ve heard about it. 
They saw the movie, but It is not a part of their experience in the same
 way that World War II was a part of my experience though I was born 
almost exactly halfway between VE and VJ day.
Memory
 is social; and forgetting, which is an integral part of memory, is also
 social. Jon Stewart delivered a memorable rant last night on the Middle
 East under the rubric Learning Curves are for Pussies. He focused on 
what we refuse to learn, but he could have as easily spoken about we 
refuse to remember, namely the long roll of disastrous American 
interventions in the region. If you understand memory in a psychological
 way, you may figure that the recollection of events decays exponentially so that old wars have a half life like U235. That 
perspective may not be entirely wrong, but it is profoundly misleading 
because in real situations our purely personal memories are repeatedly 
refreshed like the image on a computer screen. Of course, if the organs 
that ordinarily do our thinking for us, e.g., our families, our spouses,
 our friends, the internet, television, and the rest, neglect to restore
 the fading impression or decide to ignore it for some ideological or 
commercial reason, we have to fall back on our own resources. In other 
words, unless we belong to the small group that make it our business to 
actively remember, we forget. So what was so bad about Bush?
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